Recent scholarship has thoroughly documented climate change attitudes within the majority of the English-speaking countries of the USA, the UK, Canada, and Australia. In these nations, political identity is widely recognized as a uniquely powerful predictor of climate change attitudes and, at least in the USA, several studies have found that education moderates the effect of political identity. The cross-national dynamics of climate change attitudes and political identity are not well-characterized, particularly in nations with a history of state socialism. In this manuscript, we consider the role of political and free market ideological polarization around climate change within Anglophone, Western European, and postCommunist states. Further, we investigate education as a moderator of political and ideological factors cross-nationally. We suggest that, in comparison to Western European and postCommunist states, the role of political and ideological polarization in Anglophone states is exceptional in shaping climate change attitudes. Using data for 20 countries in the 2010 ISSP Environmental Module, we find that the effect of party affiliation and free market ideology on the perception of climate change's danger and importance is strongest in Anglophone states, more modest in Western European countries, and limited within post-Communist states. Further, education moderates most intensely in Anglophone states. Our results suggest that there is something exceptional occurring within Anglophone states with regard to political polarization and climate change attitudes.
Introduction
Climate change is a global issue that requires coordinated action from all countries worldwide, yet significant barriers remain in ameliorating, and adapting to, climate change. Scholars have thoroughly documented climate change attitudes in English-speaking countries, such as the USA, the UK, Canada, and Australia. In these nations, political identity is widely recognized as a uniquely powerful predictor of climate change attitudes and, at least in the USA, many studies have found that education moderates the effect of political identity (Hamilton 2011 , McCright 2011 . While there is a vast literature about English-speaking countries, the crossnational dynamics of climate change attitudes and political identity are not as well-characterized, particularly in nations with a history of state socialism. This analysis is motivated by two research questions. First, is political and ideological polarization around climate change unique to English-speaking nations? To answer this question, we compare climate change attitudes within three country groupings-Anglophone, Western European, and post-Communist states-identifying the divergent patterning of political and ideological polarization within these states. Second, we ask if the education moderates the effect of political and ideological factors cross-nationally. This relationship has been repeatedly observed in the USA, but it is not well understood in other national contexts.
Utilizing cross-national data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2010 module, we find that the effect of political identity and free market ideology on climate change attitudes is strongest in Anglophone nations, more modest in Western European states, and weaker in post-Communist states. Further, education moderates political identity and free market ideology in Anglophone nations, but this interaction appears to be weaker in Western European states and we find no evidence of an interaction in post-Communist societies.
Background

Partisan polarization in the USA
Much of the literature on polarization around climate change focuses in the USA. In the USA, partisan polarization of climate change is well-documented, with significant disagreement about the existence of climate change and appropriate policies hinging largely upon political ideologies or identities (Leiserowitz 2006; McCright and Dunlap 2011a, b; Guber 2013) . Political identities (e.g., liberal vs. conservative) are best understood as social identities somewhat akin to other social identities like religion, or race/ethnicity (Iyengar et al. 2012; Colvin et al. 2015) . This perspective suggests that people will reconcile their viewpoints with those of their group-for instance, people who identify as Bliberal^will adjust their attitudes in line with other Bliberals,^particularly when partisan identities are personally salient (Unsworth and Fielding 2014) . This process tends to smooth-over differences within identity-based communities, leading to partisan polarization (Greene 2004; Mason 2015) .
Group-level political opinions are often shaped by elite members' cues and attitudes. In an experimental study, Cohen (2003) finds that Republican participants were supportive of tax increases if told that Republican politicians had endorsed these policies, while Democraticidentifying participants were supportive of cuts to welfare state programs if leading Democratic politicians proposed the cuts. These findings are corroborated by subsequent research (Malka and Lelkes 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2011a; Tesler 2017 )-individuals do not hold coherent, internally consistent beliefs and preferences, but are rather highly responsive to elite cues from in-group members, particularly in-group members of elite status (Layman and Carsey 2002; Arceneaux 2008) . Thus, adopting the appropriate viewpoints of one's in-group has been called Bidentity protective cognition,^because it can preserve status within the ingroup (Kahan 2015 (Kahan , 2017 . Sharp partisan differences in climate change attitudes emerged in the USA by the late 1990s (McCright et al. 2014; Dunlap et al. 2016) . The current polarization is rooted in concerted efforts by elite conservative actors to shift public opinion. Chief among these actors are a dense network of conservative think tanks and public relations firms (McCright and Dunlap 2003; Jacques et al. 2008 ) with significant funding from fossil fuel interests. These voices were subsequently amplified by sympathetic media outlets (Feldman et al. 2012; Hmielowski et al. 2014) . In addition to these institutional drivers of climate change denial in the USA, climate change denial may also be rooted in conservatives' endorsement of Bfree markets^as the ideal economic system. McCright (2011) explains that such free market ideology may encourage climate change denial because addressing climate change via policy requires government intervention in ostensibly unfettered markets-a phenomena that has been dubbed Bsolution aversion ( Campbell and Kay 2014) . However, it is unclear if this polarization-whether driven by political identities or free market ideology-is a uniquely American phenomenon or if these differences are equally persistent cross-nationally.
Climate change, partisanship, and ideology cross-nationally
Anglophone states
While research on the politics of climate change abounds in the USA, the relationship between political identities and climate change attitudes has been given comparatively less scrutiny in other Anglophone national contexts (e.g., the UK, Canada, and Australia). In general, change skepticism is in these nations appears to be growing over time, but it is not as pronounced as in the USA (Poortinga et al. 2011; Carter 2014) .
In the UK, several studies demonstrate a link between political identity and climate change beliefs. Conservative party identification is associated with climate change skepticism (Poortinga et al. 2011; Carter and Clements 2015) , increased likelihood to question the scientific consensus on climate change (Whitmarsh 2011) , and decreased likelihood to make behavioral changes for climate change (Johnston and Deeming 2016) .
In Canada, the Conservative Harper-era government suppressed climate research and implemented a policy agenda to promote fossil fuels (Way 2011; MacNeil and Paterson 2016) . Canada similarly hosts an organized Bclimate denial^movement affiliated with movements in the USA (Hoggan and Littlemore 2009; Greenberg et al. 2011 ). LaChapelle et al. (2012 also finds that conservatives are less likely to believe in the existence of climate change.
Australia is also a home to a well-funded movement that seeks to erode public confidence in climate science and halt any climate policy initiatives (Hamilton 2007; McKewon 2012) . Tranter (2011 Tranter ( , 2013 finds that Labor and Green Party supporters are significantly more likely to endorse the consensus view on global warming and have higher global warming risk perceptions than voters who endorsed a center-right coalition of parties. Like the USA, free market ideology is associated with climate change skepticism in Australia (Heath and Gifford 2006; Lewandowsky et al. 2013 ).
Western European states
Even less research has focused on the role of political affiliation on climate change attitudes within Western European states. In recent decades, the European Union and domestic European governments have been far more proactive on climate change policies than the USA and have experienced fewer organized climate change denialist campaigns (Selin and VanDeveer 2012) . Still, McCright et al. (2016) find conservatives in the Western Europe are less likely to believe that climate change poses a serious threat, and are less apt to engage in ameliorative actions. Similarly, Lewis et al. (2018) find that left of center party affiliation is associated with the belief that global warming is a serious problem in Western Europe, but not as strongly as in English-speaking countries. Tvinnereim (2015) reports that right-affiliated voters are less likely to be concerned about climate change in several Western European states. In Germany, conservative political identity has a negative relationship with support for climate change policies (Ziegler 2017) .
Post-Communist states
A notable gap in the literature is the of analysis of post-Communist states; while there are relatively few studies that examine climate change beliefs specifically, there is a developing literature on environmental public opinion, environmental policy support, and environmental behaviors within post-Communist states. Tynkkynen (2010) argues that, in some Russian policy circles, being active in global efforts to address climate change is a way of asserting that the nation is a global power. Van Hiel and Kossowska (2007) find that environmentalism and cultural conservatism are linked among Ukrainians. And while state socialist societies historically had notoriously terrible environmental records, many also encouraged the development of conservation organizations that survived the transition process (Carmin and Fagan 2010) . Given this history, environmental attitudes in post-Communist states might differ from those in other nations. Chaisty and Whitefield (2015) found differences in support for environmental policy between post-Communist and Western European states, as environmental conditions were a very low priority under Communist regimes. Further, Rohrschneider and Miles (2015) note that environmental issues are more central to representative parties in Western European states. Recent studies also report little partisan divergence on a range of climate change attitudes within post-Communist nations Lewis et al. 2018) . Within postCommunist states, there is less willingness to sacrifice for their environment than in Western Europe (Haller and Hadler 2008; Hadler and Wohlkönig 2012; Marquart-Pyatt 2012) . Given that climate change-and environmental issues in general-is seen as less salient by the residents of these nations, political polarization might be lower in post-Communist states ). et al. (2016) note that the meaning of right-left party affiliations may be largely inconsistent cross-nationally, particularly within post-Communist states, complicating cross-cultural comparisons of political polarization. Right-leaning political parties in Anglophone and Western European states typically endorse policy agendas centered on privatization, deregulation, and liberalizing markets. In post-Communist states, the opposite is often true, with left learning parties endorsing trade liberalization and a stronger role for the market. McCright (2011) connects free market ideology with political orientation, as environmental protections require market intervention and therefore is in opposition to conservative ideologies, while protection of the environment is more consistent with left-wing views about the role of the state in promoting the collective welfare of the citizenry. Heath and Gifford (2006) argue that because free market ideologies suppose that the Binvisible hand^will correct for failures of the economic system, there is little need for an individual to be concerned about the environment. As such, adopting an approach that utilizes measures of the more traditional political affiliations (e.g., left-right spectrum) alongside indicators of free market ideology is called for in cross-national analyses of climate change attitudes.
Cross-national conceptions of political identity
McCright
Political polarization moderated by education
Education is typically related to greater environmental concern and likelihood to support environmental collective actions (Dietz et al. 1998; Pampel and Hunter 2012) . Several recent studies have observed a moderating relationship between education and political variables (e.g., party identification or political ideology) in the USA, where education amplifies climate change concern among political liberals. But, the opposite is true for conservatives, where higher education is associated with decreased concerns about climate change (Hamilton 2011; McCright 2011) . The moderating effect of education on political identities or affiliations persists for varied climate change attitudes in the USA, including climate skepticism (Hamilton and Stampone 2013; Stevenson et al. 2014) , self-assessed climate change knowledge (Hamilton and Stampone 2013; , and trust in climate change science Hamilton 2016) . Other research has shown that more sophisticated respondents (e.g., those with more scientific literacy) tend to have more polarized views on controversial scientific issues (Drummond and Fischhoff 2017; Kahan et al. 2012 ) and backfire effects are more common among knowledgeable partisans (Flynn, Nyhan and Reifler 2017) .
Comparatively less literature has investigated the moderating effect of education crossnationally. Tranter and Booth (2015) find that education moderates party affiliation in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the UK, but in the opposite direction of the US-based literature. That is, the partisan polarization around climate change decreased at higher levels of educational attainment.
Based upon this literature reviewed above, we expect that right-wing political affiliation and free market ideological beliefs will be associated with lower perceptions of the danger posed by climate change, and lower the perceived importance of climate change as an issue. We also suspect that these effects will be most pronounced in Anglophone states, more modest in Western European nations, and rather muted in post-Communist states. Further, we anticipate that education will significantly moderate the effect of free market ideology and partisan affiliation in Anglophone states, with greater polarization at higher levels of education. However, we suspect that the polarizing impact of education will be much weaker in Western European states, and again, weaker still in postCommunist nations.
Methods
Data
For this analysis, we utilize social survey data from 20 1 countries available in the ISSP's 2010 Environment Module. The ISSP is a cross-national collection of national surveys which adopt similar items and survey methodologies. The 2010 module focuses primarily on environmental attitudes and behaviors, while still including the core components of the ISSP program. For the 20 countries in this study, the national sample sizes range from 928 to 2253. Responses were collected through face-to face interviews or self-administered questionnaires. Of the countries where reporting information is available, the average response rate was 51.7% 2 (Gendall 2012) .
Dependent variables
We utilize two questions specific to climate change from the 2010 ISSP dataset. For our first dependent variable, 'climate danger,' respondents were asked about their perception of the danger posed by increased global temperatures as a result of climate change, with ordered responses ranging from B1^Bnot dangerous at all^to B3^Bsomewhat dangerous^to B5B extremely dangerous.^Twenty-three percent of respondents viewed climate change as Bextremely dangerous.^The second dependent variable, issue importance, identifies whether individuals perceive climate change as the most important environmental problem facing their country. Among ten environmental problems, climate change had the second most responses, roughly 15% of respondents. We dichotomized this indicator, where respondents listing climate change as the most important problem are coded as B1,^and all others are coded as B0.^3 These two dependent variables represent similar, but analytically distinct, constructs. These variables are weakly correlated at the individual level, (r = 0.16), and there is substantial variation in the cross-national patterning of responses. 
Focal predictor variables
To understand the partisan dynamics of climate change attitudes, we first adopt an indicator of Bparty affiliation,^which places respondents' support for national parties on a cross-nationally comparative right-left continuum.
5 These party affiliations range from 1 Bfar right^to 3 Bcenter^to 5 Bfar left.^Similar political variables have been used in recent cross-national studies (Franzen and Vogl 2013; Tranter and Booth 2015) .
In order to investigate the ideological roots of polarization, we adopt the variable Bfree market ideology^as a second focal predictor, which measures how much the respondent believes that private enterprise is the best way to solve their countries' problems, ranging from B1^Bstrongly agree^to B5^Bstrongly disagree.^Party affiliation and free market ideology are moderately correlated within Anglophone (r s = 0.31) and Western European states (r s = 0.33). But this association is weaker for post-Communist countries (r s = 0.14). We present independent analyses for party affiliation and free market ideology on both dependent variables.
Lastly, we examine the moderating role of education by utilizing a measure of highest obtained degree, where education is coded from 1 Blowest^to 5 Buniversity degree.^We interact education independently with party affiliation and free market ideology, treating both variables as continuous.
Country groupings
We organize countries into three groups: BAnglophone,^BWestern European,^and BpostCommunist^states. 6 The BAnglophone^states are those with a dominant English-speaking citizenry. We included the UK in this group, and not the BWestern European^states, due to the presence of conservative advocacy groups and right-wing media outlets similar to those found in the USA, Canada, and Australia (Hoggan and Littlemore 2009; Carter 2014; Carter and Clements 2015) .
European Union Member States are organized by their historical tradition, where BWestern European^states (accession in 1996 or prior) are placed into a single group, while those with a socialist state background are placed along with Russian respondents into the BpostCommunist^group. Responses from Germany are disaggregated into East (BpostCommunist^) and West Germany (BWestern European^). This distinction between postCommunist states in Europe is guided by the literature noted above, as we expect that the relationship between party affiliation, free market ideology, and climate change attitudes varies across these groupings.
Control variables
We include standard controls for demographic factors using dummy indicators for gender and rural location, and continuous indicators of age and income decile (per country).
7 Following Inglehart and Abramson (1999), we control for post-materialist values, coded B1^materialist, B2^mixed, and B3^post-materialist. 
Estimation strategy
Given the nested nature of our data-individuals are nested within countries-we rely on multi-level ordinal and binary logistic regression models. Since our data contains 20 level-two units, we employ a conservative modeling approach, allowing intercepts, but not slopes, to randomly vary across nations (Stegmueller 2013; Bryan and Jenkins 2016) . We estimate two models for each of the dependent variables separately for both party affiliation and free market ideology. The first models include the focal predictors and all covariates, while the second models include education as a moderator for party affiliation or free market ideology. We include dummy variables for our country groupings, which are initially interacted with the focal predictors, party affiliation and free market ideology, in the first models. In the second models, these groupings are further interacted with education, resulting in a three-way interaction.
As logistic coefficients are notoriously difficult to interpret, we calculate predicted probabilities to illustrate the substantive implications of our models using the-margins-command in Stata 14.2 (Brambor et al. 2006; Mood 2010) . These are probabilities are calculated for the belief that climate change is Bextremely dangerous^9 for the climate danger models and for perceiving climate change as the greatest environmental threat from the issue importance models. To interpret our results, we visualize predicted probabilities at representative values of our focal predictors, as opposed to relying upon significance testing to determine the presence of moderation (Ai and Norton 2003; Berry et al. 2010 ). The predicted probabilities were calculated by holding control variables at their observed values and averaging the probabilities for each score of the focal predictor variables (party affiliation and free market ideology and the interaction with education).
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Results
The following section presents the results from our multi-level logistic regression models for climate danger and issue importance. First, we consider how party affiliation and free market ideology influence the dependent variables across the Anglophone, Western European, and post-Communist country groupings and then we discuss the moderating effect of education within these regimes.
Climate danger
We present results from our regression models for climate danger in Table 1 , provide predicted probabilities of the multi-level binary logistic regression for climate danger by party affiliation and free market ideology for each country grouping in Fig. 1 , and plot the moderating effect of education for party affiliation and free market ideology in Fig. 2 .
In Fig. 1 , the effect of party affiliation on the likelihood of viewing climate change as Bextremely dangerous^is highest within Anglophone countries, where individuals on the far right have an average predicted probability of 0.07, compared to 0.39 for those on the far left, for a total effective difference of + 0.32. Western European countries had more moderate polarization along party lines, with a difference of + 0.15 between individuals on the far right and far left, while there were minimal differences within the post-Communist states. More substantively, people on the right in Anglophone states are far less likely than those in Western European or post-Communist states to perceive climate change as an extreme danger. But, those on the far left in Anglophone countries are more inclined to perceive climate change as an extreme danger than people in Western Europe or post-Communist states. 9 The highest ordered response category for climate danger 10 All focal predictors are treated as continuous variables. We have performed supplementary analysis with these indicators treated as categorical variables as a robustness check, finding very minimal substantive differences. As such, we have adopted the more parsimonious modeling approach.
Free market ideology exhibits a remarkably similar pattern of effects on climate danger. In Anglophone states, individuals most supportive of free markets have a probability of 0.09, compared to 0.35 for those who do not endorse free markets. The effects of free market ideology were comparatively more modest within Western Europe, and very small in postCommunist countries. Consistent with our expectations, the effect of party affiliation and free market ideology appears to be largest within Anglophone states.
Turning to the moderating effect of education in Fig. 2 , we again find substantial differences across groupings. Among the Anglophone states, education moderates the effect of Odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses *p value < 0.05; **p value < 0.01 party affiliation, wherein the gap between individuals with far left and far right affiliations is much wider at high levels of education. Indeed, a far-left individual with a university degree has a probability of 0.50, while the probability for far-left affiliated persons with the lowest level of education is 0.25. Among Western European states, there is a roughly similar pattern of moderation, but these effects are less amplified. In post-Communist states, education does appear moderate the impact of party affiliation on climate danger, but the effect is more moderate and in inverse directions. That is, the probability decreases with education for far-left individuals but increases for those on the far right. Overall, the interactive relationship between free market ideology and education follows a remarkably similar pattern. For Anglophone individuals opposed to free market ideology, education again greatly amplifies polarization where highly educated, anti-free market individuals are about twice as likely to say that climate change is Bextremely dangerous^(0.46) as those who have the lowest level of education (0.22). Within Western European states, there is notably less moderation. For post-Communist states, we see little evidence of an interaction between free market ideology and education. These findings are consistent with our expectations, where we suspected that education would act as a powerful moderator in Anglophone states, but less so in other national contexts.
Issue importance
Like the previous section, we present summarized results of the multi-level binary logistic regression for issue importance in Table 2 , with predicted probabilities of the multi-level binary logistic regression for issue importance by party affiliation and free market ideology for Fig. 3 , and the moderating effects of education on party affiliation and free market ideology in Fig. 4 . Figure 3 indicates that, in Anglophone states, people on the far right have an average predicted probability of 0.08, which increases to 0.27 for those on the far left. However, among Western European and post-Communist states, the probabilities are largely consistent across party affiliations, indicating little evidence of polarized attitudes within these states. Similarly, there are differences based upon free market ideology within Anglophone states, where individuals that strongly agree with private enterprise solutions have a probability of 0.10, substantively lower than those that strongly disagree (0.23). The effect of free market ideology on issue importance within Western European and post-Communist states is again minimal. These findings support Fig. 4 , education amplifies the effect of party affiliation in Anglophone states-far left affiliated persons with a university degree are roughly four times as likely to name climate change as the most important environment problem than similarity-educated far right individuals. For Western European states, Fig. 4 suggests that there is far less moderation of party affiliation by education, while in post-Communist states, these effects are miniscule in practical terms.
Lastly, there appears to be very little moderation of free market ideology by education within Anglophone states. Although support for a free market is associated with a lower probability of naming climate change as the most important environmental issue, education does not intensify or nullify this effect. In Western European states, there is also little visual indication of moderation. For post-Communist states, the pattern of the interaction is more complex, wherein lower-educated individuals who reject free markets (0.16) are more likely to report that climate change is the most important environmental problem than higher educated individuals with similar free market views (0.06). As such, our findings for the moderating effects of education on issue importance are more consistent with our expectations for party affiliation than for free market ideology.
Discussion
This paper investigates the role of political polarization in the perceived danger and issue importance of climate change within in Anglophone, Western European, and post-Communist states. We extend on previous work demonstrating political identities and ideologies are especially powerful factors in how publics from varying national contexts differentially view the severity and importance of climate change. Our findings are consistent with recent literature on the role of political identity within Anglophone (McCright and Dunlap 2011b; Lachapelle et al. 2012; Tranter 2013; Carter 2014; Dunlap et al. 2016) and Western European states (Tvinnereim 2015; McCright et al. 2016; Ziegler 2017) , and contributes to previously identified differences in environmental attitudes between Western European and postCommunist states (Haller and Hadler 2008; Marquart-Pyatt 2012; Chaisty and Whitefield 2015; McCright et al. 2016; Lewis et al. 2018) .
Our results strongly indicate that partisan and ideological polarization on climate change is concentrated in Anglophone states. Whether measured as party affiliation or free market ideology, attitudes on the danger and relative importance of climate change as an environmental issue are very polarized within Anglophone states. In Western European states, the perception that climate change is dangerous is somewhat politically polarized, but these views do not hinge upon political affiliations to any large degree in post-Communist states.
Free market ideology seems to drive individual beliefs that climate change is less dangerous, or not as important as other environmental problems, in Anglophone states. But our results imply that in Western European and post-Communist states, recognizing the importance of climate change can coexist with a firm preference for markets. This is much less the case in Anglophone nations, where there are sharp divergences between those who endorse free markets and those who are ideologically opposed to markets. The varying effect of free market ideology suggests that Anglophone conservatives' disbelief in climate change cannot simply be explained by Bsolution aversion,^as people outside the Anglophone states can maintain both support for free markets and belief in the danger and importance of climate change.
Further, our models imply that education amplifies the polarizing impact of partisan affiliation, but again, this dynamic is more powerful in Anglophone states than in other national contexts. The same can be said for ideological support of free markets-in Anglophone states, education intensifies the role of free market ideological beliefs, but the interplay between education and support for free markets is not consistent nor powerful in other settings. These findings contribute to the literature on the moderating effect of education within the USA (Hamilton 2011; McCright 2011) , suggesting that they also exist in other Anglophone states.
Broadly, our analyses further unpacks what McCright et al. (2016) describe as the Bdiffering meaning^of political affiliations in varying cross-national contexts. An important take-away of this analysis is that Anglophone states are exceptional in terms of the ideological and partisan polarization surrounding climate change. There is something atypical occurring within Anglophone states with regard to political polarization and climate change attitudes and clearly the Anglophone model of partisan polarization does not directly generalize to other nations. Although we have suggested that deliberate conservative public relations campaigns and amplification from right-leaning media are likely a root cause of this partisan polarization within Anglophone states, we acknowledge that further research is needed to determine why partisan and ideological factors are so substantial in some nations and have relatively meager roles in others.
This study is limited by the number of countries (20), as well as the wealth and economically developed skew of the countries included within the ISSP. Further analyses are required to understand the effects of political polarization in less developed nations. Specifically, studies conducted in the USA have demonstrated the power of elite cues (e.g., Cohen 2003) but it is not clear if cues from political elites can mold public environmental opinions as profoundly in other political systems, especially in young democracies like the post-Communist states. In addition, our data from 2010 predates much of the rise of right-wing populism. Developing a comprehensive understanding of the environmental and climate policy implications of nascent right-wing populist political parties is a critical task for future scholarship.
